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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
November 2020
Cooper, J.P., Higgitt, McShan, JJ.
631 Edgecombe, LP,
Petitioner-Landlord-Appellant,

NY County Clerk’s No.
570144/20

-againstRonald Walker,
Respondent-Respondent,

Calendar No. 20-143

-andSharday Bernal, Ronald Polson,
“Ronnie Doe” and “Jane Doe,”
Respondents.
Petitioner appeals from an order of the Civil Court of
the City of New York, New York County (Michelle D. Schreiber,
J.), entered on or about September 6, 2018, after a nonjury
trial, in favor of respondent Ronald Walker dismissing the
petition in a holdover summary proceeding.
Per Curiam.
Order (Michelle D. Schreiber, J.), entered on or about
September 6, 2018, affirmed, with $10 costs.
A fair interpretation of the evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that respondent Ronald Walker, the son of
the deceased rent stabilized tenant, primarily resided with
the tenant of record for two years immediately prior to her
death in March 2016, so as to entitle respondent to succession

rights (see Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR] § 2523.5[b][1];
WSC Riverside Dr. Owners LLC v Williams, 125 AD3d 458, 459
[2015], lv dismissed 25 NY3d 1221 [2015]; 318 E. 93 v Ward,
276 AD2d 277 [2000]).

This finding is amply supported by

testimonial evidence from respondent and his witnesses, which
the trial court expressly credited, and documentary evidence
connecting respondent to the apartment, such as his driver’s
license, social security and health insurance statements and
prescription receipts.

The absence of certain other

documentation, such as respondent’s tax returns and cell phone
records, is not dispositive, since the court accepted his
excuse for failing to produce such records, i.e., he lacked
assets and did not file tax returns, and “there is a
preponderance of credible personal testimony” (300 E. 34th
St. Co. v Habeeb, 248 AD2d 50, 55 [1997]).
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, neither the
documentation from the Human Resources Administration (HRA)
indicating that respondent was “undomiciled” or “homeless”
for purposes of receipt of food stamps under the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), nor respondent’s
mother’s nursing home records, which contained inconsistent
references to respondent’s residence, warrant a contrary
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result.

No single factor is dispositive of the issue of

primary residence (see Rent Stabilization Code § 2520.6[u]),
and the HRA documents and nursing home records did not
preponderate over the credible testimony and other proof
connecting respondent to the subject apartment for actual
living purposes (see 23 Jones St. Assoc. v Keebler-Beretta,
284 AD2d 109 [2001]).
In reaching our conclusion, we reject petitioner’s
contention that the information in the HRA records as to
respondent being undomiciled or homeless should be treated
as outcome determinative as to respondent’s primary
residence, rather than one of many factors to be considered.
The cases relied upon by petitioner, such as Katz Park Ave.
Corp. v Jagger (11 NY3d 314, 317 [2008] [tenant's status as
holder of a B-2 tourist visa logically incompatible with
primary residence in New York]), and Matter of Ansonia Assoc.
L.P. v Unwin (130 AD3d 453, 454 [2015] [tenant's tax returns
on which she deducted her entire rent as a business expense
logically incompatible with primary residence]), are
factually inapposite and do not compel a contrary result.
Unlike those cases, here, no testimony or other evidence was
adduced to show that the information in the records was based
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upon respondent’s sworn declarations that he resided
elsewhere (see Matter of Brookford, LLC v New York State Div.
of Hous. & Community Renewal, 142 AD3d 433, 435 [2016], affd
31 NY3d 679 [2018]). In any event, assuming arguendo, that
respondent made declarations to HRA that he was undomiciled
or homeless, petitioner failed to show that such declarations
are logically incompatible with a determination of “primary
residence” - a term the Rent Stabilization Code does not define
except to say that “no single factor shall be solely
determinative,” and to list “evidence which may be considered”
in making the determination (RSC § 2520.6[u]).
Finally, petitioner waived any right to a missing witness
inference for respondent’s failure to call any building
tenants as witnesses by failing to timely request it at trial
(see Spoto v S.D.R. Constr., 226 AD2d 202, 204 [1996]).

In

any event, the inference that a trier of fact would draw from
a missing witness charge is not mandatory, but merely
permissive (see 318 E. 93 v Ward, 276 AD2d at 278).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
I concur

I concur

November 20, 2020

4

I concur

